Background

Managerial re-appointments are a rare phenomenon in football, only seeming to occur where a formerly successful coach is brought back in the hope of rekindling the passions of a former time.

Otherwise, they are symbolically difficult, their occurrence suggesting a return to an ultimately unsuccessful past when many stakeholders would prefer someone new, promising a different future. They also suggest a lack of viable options, or indeed an inability of decision-makers to see beyond personal relationships.

In April 2017, Kwasi Appiah was re-appointed as the Head Coach of the Ghana senior men’s national team, the Black Stars, less than three years after his first tenure ended following a difficult 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil.

In some respects, the re-appointment was unsurprising. Appiah was a trailblazer in Ghanaian football, having been the first Ghanaian Head Coach to oversee a successful World Cup qualification and manage the team at a World Cup. The difficulties the side encountered at that tournament were perhaps seen as being beyond the coach’s control, with the 59-year-old made the scapegoat by more senior figures in the shadows.

Unfortunately, Appiah’s second tenure proved to be unsuccessful. World Cup qualification was always likely to be difficult, as he inherited a team that was five points behind Egypt after just two matches. Nevertheless, in four World Cup qualifying matches under his leadership, the Black Stars managed just one victory, albeit a thumping one away against Congo-Brazzaville. For the first time since 2006, Ghana would not be competing at a World Cup.

As expected, the side qualified for the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON). Securing a tournament place was made simpler by Sierra Leone’s ejection from the qualifying competition, placing Ghana in a group of three teams competing for two spots at the showpiece in Egypt. Be that as it may, qualification was not always plain sailing, with Kenya proving a disconcertingly difficult opponent.

The team’s difficulties against Kenya in qualifying proved portentous of their struggles at the tournament proper. Lacking a threat in attack, just one victory during normal time was achieved before the Black Stars were knocked out by Tunisia on penalties in the last 16.

Though Appiah remained in charge as Ghana commenced their qualification for AFCON 2021, the new board of the GFA opted not to renew his contract in December 2019, bringing an end to his second tenure. He ended his second spell having supervised 22 games, won 10, drawn 8 and lost 4.

Aims

This report aims to investigate the Black Stars’ performances during Appiah’s second tenure (2017-2019). In line with the focus of the African Sports Centre, it will make heavy use of data, research and technology in order to achieve this aim.

It will identify certain statistics and statistical trends, and combine those statistics with video analysis, in order to draw possible conclusions as to why Ghana failed to perform up to the standards of their peers.

This analysis will be divided into two broad areas: defence and attack.

*Limited data available for October 10, 2017 friendly vs Saudi Arabia and AFCON 2019 warm-up matches, so those games are (perhaps thankfully) not deeply considered in the study.

Explanation of key terms

Expected goals (xG)

Expected goals, often abbreviated to “xG”, is a statistical measure of a team’s or player’s shot quality and/or chance of scoring a goal. It is also a useful indicator of chance creation and of overall effective attacking play.

Every shot attempted is given an Expected Goal Value (EGV), based on a number of variables such as distance from goal, the shot angle, the height of the ball when the player took the shot and the number of opponents between the ball and the goal. The EGV is based on historic shooting data.

The EGV of each shot can be added together to make an overall figure for xG for any period of time, for example a single match or an entire season. This is used as a representation of attacking output.

In this report, we use xG, xGA, xG/90, xGA/90, xG/Shot and xGA/Shot.

xG is the overall sum of the EGVs of shots Ghana had in a given match or tournament.

xGA is expected goals against. This is the overall sum of the EGVs of shots Ghana allowed in a given match or tournament.

When we use xG/90, we are producing a number showing the average expected goals for Ghana per 90 minutes of football. Conversely, when we use xGA/90, we are producing a number showing the average expected goals Ghana allowed per 90 minutes of football.

xG/shot is a more detailed measure of shot quality. It represents the expected goals per shot taken by Ghana. xGA/shot measures the shot quality Ghana allowed their opponents – the expected goals per shot allowed.

Progressive passes

Progressive passes, as defined by Wyscout, are forward passes that are 30m long when the pass starts in the team’s own half or at least 10m in length in the opponent’s half. They are considered a useful illustration of the attacking intent of the passer.

We use progressive passes and progressive passes/90. The latter measure demonstrates the number of progressive passes Ghana made per 90 minutes of football.

Recoveries

Recoveries occur when a player recovers the ball in a situation where neither team has possession or where the ball has been played directly to him by an opponent, thus securing possession for their team.

Recoveries/90 measures the number of recoveries Ghana made per 90 minutes of football.

Now let’s get to business!

Defence

There can be little doubt that Appiah managed to mould the team into a relatively effective defensive unit. Over the course of his time as Ghana coach, the team’s xGA/90 declined substantially.

This was in part due to a similarly stark decrease in opponent shot volume. Ghana’s defence was capable of significantly limiting their opponent’s volume of shots. Clearly, this is a major part of reducing the opponents’ attacking threat. This quantitative decrease is shown below.

Additionally, Appiah’s charges also improved at limiting opposition shot quality substantially under his tutelage. This qualitative decrease is shown by Ghana’s opponents’ declining xGA/Shot. Statistically, Appiah built a solid defensive unit that reduced opponents shot volume and quality.

This culminated in a reasonably impressive AFCON performance on the defensive side of the ball. The Black Stars allowed the second lowest shots against/90, xGA/90 and xGA/Shot amongst the teams we studied. For the most part, they were an effective defensive unit.

 

 

 

A feature of their play was their ability to recover the ball in higher areas of the field. This understandably reduced their opponent’s ability to move the ball into areas from which they could take and create shots effectively. Out of the teams we studied at AFCON 2019, Ghana had the second most recoveries in high areas of the field and the second highest percentage of their overall recoveries in high areas of the field.

Furthermore, the team also performed well in individual defensive match-ups. The Black Stars were second to Senegal, who are extremely highly regarded defensively, in defensive dual win rate and defensive challenges won.

The team’s statistical defensive success was built around Appiah’s 4-4-2 formation. The players were generally able to stay reasonably compact, with the midfield and attack often particularly well-connected. The front line, normally led by Jordan Ayew, selectively pressed the opponents back line but also cut off the easy routes of supply to the midfield. The opposition often found the connection between their deepest players & their attackers completely severed, whilst they struggled to play to their own midfielders. This forced them to play a direct game that suited Ghana’s defenders.

In both these examples, Ghana’s compactness and selective press is on show. The attackers and midfielders are well-connected, making it difficult for Tunisia to get the ball to their midfielders. When the ball is played back, Jordan Ayew makes a curved run to cut off the right side, forcing Tunisia into a corner.

Furthermore, if Ghana did find themselves forced back into their own half, they were able to defend in an extremely compact shape. The front two often helped their teammates out by making it difficult for the opponents to recycle the ball. Their opponents had to play high risk into congested areas, or attempt to cross. Both solutions are sub-optimal as far as quality chance creation.

Ghana’s defensive compactness is clearly on show here. Passes into central areas are made extremely risky. Furthermore, as South Africa attempt to reset, Ghana’s strikers harass the deeper players and force an error.

However, errors and problems in transition did allow for opponents to get high quality chances. At AFCON 2019, against Benin & against Tunisia, Ghana conceded soft goals as a result of structural issues. Fewer, but still high quality chances is still a problem. In fact, during AFCON, Ghana allowed higher quality shots than they managed to create for themselves (0.089 xGA/Shot vs 0.081 xG/Shot).

Here, Ghana’s midfielders’ and defenders’ poor positioning and defensive decision-making led to Benin’s goal. With Thomas Partey stepping up to attempt to win the ball, Wakaso must drop to cover him. Instead, Wakaso is caught ball-watching and doesn’t move even as the ball breaks free.

Meanwhile, John Boye has stepped up behind Benin’s dropping striker, a risky move with the full-backs a significant distance away anyway. Kasim Adams must drop off to cover him. Adams also steps up, leaving a gaping hole in the centre of defence. Benin exploit it.

This in part stems from poor attacking structure and decision making. The Ghanaian players were disconnected in attack, with large spaces between the players and few available options. Adams played a long ball upfield. Despite not being compact, the players proceed to attempt to press high, only exaggerating their lack of connectedness and compactness. Tunisia are able to play through them and score.

Attack

Whilst the Black Stars improved defensively under Appiah, the same cannot be said for their attack. The most notable issue during the Ghanaian tactician’s second tenure was the team’s growing toothlessness in attack. During his time as coach, the team became progressively less effective as an attacking force, with overall xG in each match, as well as the team’s time adjusted xG/90 minutes, declining.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ghana’s declining xG and minutes adjusted xG/90 show the team’s declining attacking output. The main difference between the two graphs is in game 16, which was the team’s round of 16 clash with Tunisia at the 2019 AFCON that went to extra time. The time adjusted measure of xG/90 demonstrates that in that match, the Black Starts were not as creative as they appear in the first graph showing overall xG per match.

What was the cause of the team’s declining attacking output? Statistically, the team’s shot volume/90 decreased over the course of Appiah’s tenure. This quantitative decrease is shown below.

More concerning, however, was that the team’s shot quality decreased. It fell fairly substantially during Appiah’s tenure. The below xG/Shot graph demonstrates that qualitative decrease.

Statistical studies of football have demonstrated that shooting is somewhat like the lottery. However, it is not a case of simply buying a ticket and hoping to win the lottery. A football team should attempt to buy as many good tickets as possible; they should look to take as many good quality shots as possible. Under Appiah, Ghana failed to do so. Their shot volume and shot quality decreased.

This culminated in Ghana’s woeful attacking performance at the 2019 AFCON. When compared with several other sides (finalists Algeria and Senegal, and Ghana’s West African rivals Nigeria, Cameroon and the Côte d’Ivoire), Ghana had the second worst xG/90 and by far the worst xG/Shot. At the showcase event, Ghana were considerably worse at creating chances than their peers.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ghana’s xG/Shot during the tournament was 0.081. The next worst team and the only other team from those studied who had an xG/Shot of less than 0.100 was Cameroon who had an xG/Shot of 0.097. Senegal led the teams studied, with xG/shot of 0.131.

Shot quality is heavily influenced by shot location. Whilst Ghana were shooting more times per 90 minutes than their peers, they were also taking substantially more of their shots from outside the penalty area. They had the highest average shot distance out of the studied teams by a substantial margin (21.22m, next furthest was Nigeria with 19.46m). This has a significant negative impact on a team’s chances of scoring. Ghana’s shot maps from AFCON do not compare favourably to those of Senegal. Ghana clearly take a significantly higher proportion of their shots from outside the penalty area.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ghana also crossed more than any of the other studied sides, with the exception of Cameroon (who were the second worst side in shot quality). Problematically, they were also by far the least accurate crossers of the teams studied.

Crossing is a relatively ineffective way of creating chances. Headed chances are the most difficult to convert and are at their most effective within the six yard area. Furthermore, a defence is often at a significant quantitative advantage, making it easier to defend in crossing situations. The high volume of crossing as a means of chance creation and Ghana’s poor quality of crossing are likely to have contributed to Ghana’s poor shot quality during the 2019 AFCON.

Ghana also lacked quality ball progression, particularly high up the field. Ghana’s most frequent ball progressors during the tournament were often their full-backs or Mubarak Wakaso, regularly the team’s deepest lying midfielder. They did not progress the ball well in high, central areas and seriously lacked capable ball progressors high up the field. For many effective sides, a significant number of chances are assisted directly from these areas, or the pass leading to the assist originates there. When looking at Algeria’s high volume progressive passers, the names of Riyadh Mahrez, Youcef Belaïli and Sofiane Feghouli frequently appear.

 

 

 

 

 

 

This lack of ball progression through the middle was a major factor in Ghana’s lack of creativity and inability to create high quality chances. This is statistically shown by their low xG/90, their low xG/shot, as well as their lack of touches in the opposition penalty area. The Black Stars had the second fewest touches in the opposition penalty area per 90 minutes played of the teams studied at AFCON 2019.

Much of Ghana’s problems stem from the manner in which the team played Appiah’s favoured formation, 4-4-2. The main issue was the way the team vacated the centre of the field. They were left with insufficient bodies in central areas, forcing the team to progress down the flanks. This led to the full-backs and Wakaso appearing atop the team’s progressive pass numbers (and many of Wakaso’s progressive passes were playing to the full-backs). Generally, this is not an uncommon issue for teams playing a 4-4-2 formation

On both occasions above, Ghana’s back four and the midfield double pivot are very deep, whilst the wide midfielders and front two are very high. This results in a complete lack of options between the lines. Furthermore, the opposition are not being stretched or challenged horizontally. The team are forced to play a low percentage vertical ball to attempt to progress forwards.

When facing a 4-4-2 press, Ghana needed one of their midfielders to drop back alongside the centre-backs. This would enable them to outflank and outnumber the opponents’ front two, giving them more control in deep areas. They would then need other players to come into midfield (most likely the wide midfielders), with the full-backs pushing up to provide width.

Additionally, when the team did get into a good shape, they made poor decisions on the ball.

The Black Stars have created an effective shape to progress the ball, with options in midfield who can receive the ball and move it on. However, the decision making of the deeper players is poor. Wakaso plays a speculative long ball. Mensah fails to carry forwards to make a progressive pass easier, instead hitting a hopeful vertical pass.

With Ghana on the attack, the ball is squared to Wakaso. He has three options centrally positioned on the edge of the penalty area. Instead of passing to those players, he takes a long shot, which flies off target.

Furthermore, the team also made poor decisions to threaten in attacking transition. Though they were given few opportunities, due to most of their opponents showing them considerable respect and keeping players behind the ball, the team still failed to make the most out of transition opportunities in attack.

Conclusion

Kwasi Appiah’s tenure should therefore be seen as one in which the team located a functional defensive structure but struggled offensively. Under his leadership, the Black Stars were an increasingly effective defensive unit, albeit one that was occasionally let down by poor decision making, losses of concentration and poor transition. However, in attack, the team became concerningly limited, despite the available personnel.

Even so, there are undoubtedly building blocks upon which Appiah’s successor, C.K. Akonnor, can add his expertise. Nevertheless, it is clear that Akonnor must implement offensive structures that enable the team to possess the football, create high quality chances and then transition smoothly into a cohesive defensive unit. Along with selecting players that complement each other within those structures, that will be Akonnor’s biggest test.

Part 2 of this piece focuses on the players new Ghana coach CK Anonnor has at his disposal. We analyse their statistical profiles, identifying players who can contribute to team and how they may be able to do so. Click on this link to read Part 2.